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In the Supreme Court
of the State of Utah
In the matter of the Estate of ORA BUNDY,
Deceased.
DORA B. GODDARD and JOHN A. BUNDY,
A pp·ellants,
vs.
LOVINA R. BUNDY, as Administratrix and
Personally,
Resp-ondent.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
This is an appeal by Dora B. Goddard and John
A. Bundy, children and heirs at law of Ora Bundy, deceased, from the decree of distribution of the lower
court overruling their objections to the final account
and petition of the administratrix, and excluding . the
appellant John A. Bundy from participation in the final
distribution. Appellants have also appealed from the
order of the lower court refusing to relieve them of
their default and to permit them to file o~t of time their
motions for amendment of the findings and decree and
for a new trial.
The respondent, Lovina R. Bundy, is the widow of
the decedent, and acted as administratrix of his estate.
She is the step-mother of the appellants.
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Appellants' objections were to a. credit of $10,600
claimed by respondent for family allowance paid herself
during a protracted administration, to the respondent's
failure to inventory and account for certain property,
particularly furniture of the estate, and to payment of
compensation to respondent administratrix, appellants
claiming respondent had waived the same, and further,
has forfeited the right to compensation by misconduct
in office in eonnection with the other matters involved.
The appellant John A. Bundy was excluded from
final distribution on the lower court's own motion and
'
this action also is here involve_d.
The foregoing brief statement of the issues is intended to be merely preliminary and for purposes of
orientation.
In this statement, for convenience, the files of the
lower court embracing the petitions, pleadings, orders,
inventories, accounts, etc., filed with the clerk will be
referred to as the ''Record'' (R), and the transcript of
the testimony on the hearing of appellants' objections
to the aecount will be referred to as the "Transcript"
(Tr.), and the transcript of the testimony (filed herein
July 11, 1950) of John A. Bundy on the return on
August 8, 1949, of the citation issued to him will be
referred to as the "Supplemental Transcript," ( S·Tr.).
Ora Bundy died intestate on June 12, 1946, leaving
him surviving his widow, the respondent, and his two
children by a former marriage, the appellants herein.
{R 001, :002)
Mrs. Bundy first appeared on the scene as a. house~
kee-per, three or four years before her marriage. (Tr. 2)
At the time of the marriage of decedent and respond2
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ent on November 26, 1926, the appellants \vert~ children
of tender years. Thereafter and until the marringe of
appellants they and their father and step-mother maintained an ordinary family relationship, (Tr. 12, 21, 27),
although the dang·hter, Dora Goddard, felt some hesitation about questioning the activities of her stepmother
after her father's death. (Tr. 21) Dora reposed confidence in her step-mother to look after her interests. (Tr.
21)
At the time of his death Ora Bundy was in the contracting bu~iness in partnership with his wife and two
children. He owned a 35% interest, Mrs. Bundy a
25% interest, aJ?-d the two children 20% each. (Objectors Ex. 7, Tr. 89)
Lovina Bundy testified that she brought to this
marriage some furniture, some personal things, and nine
shares of Davis & Weber Counties Canal Co. stock worth
about $1260 on her own estimate. ( Tr. 52 and 2) Her
father left her about $3000, but this was mostly used up
before Bundy's death. (Tr. 52)
During the period of her marriage to Mr. Bundy
the respondent was never gainfully employed. (Tr. 51)
And yet at the time of Mr. Bundy's death she had, -or
acquired by right of survivorship of him separate property as follows :

3
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Probable Value

Item

9 shares stock of Davis & W eher
Counties Canal Co. ----------------------------------$1260.00
Life Insurance on decedent's life,
payable $87.50 semi -annually ---------~------ 5000.00
U. S. War Savings Bonds (Series
E) ._____ ...... ____________ ---------------------------------------- 4916.00
U. S. Bonds, Series G---------------------------------- 1000.00
W. 0 .W. Life Insurance on decedent's life ------------------------------------------------ 1017.30
Family Home at 1432 25th Street,
Ogden, Utah, sold 15 months
later for ------------------------------------------------------17900.00
Savings account -------------------------------------------- 300.00
Checking account ---------------------------------- ''not large''
25% interest on Ora Bundy & Co.,
a co-partnership (realized, at
date of trial, approximately)-------------·---- 9548.00
Total. .......... _______________________________ $40,941.30
(Tr. 2-4, 109-110)
Then, on August 27, 1947, in partial distribution of
the estate, the respondent received $10,000 in cash together with a 10 foot strip of land which constituted a
par,t of the lot on which the family home was situate.
(R 096-097, 161)
During the period of the Bundy marriage, Mr.
Bundy paid all the bills except a few small purchases
of odds. and ends of furniture, dishes, etc.., which Mrs.
Bundy testified she purchased out of her own money.
(Tr. 12-13, 51-53) But at the time of his death there
4
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'"'as in the family home a substantial amount of furniture paid for directly by ~Ir. Bundy. (Tr. 54, 14-18)
The efforts of counsel for appellants to question Mrs.
Bundy and :\Irs. Goddard as to the identity of this property (""hieh "·as never inventoried by respondent) were
defeated by ruling·s of the court, entered in part on the
court's o'vn motion, excluding- the evidence and instructing the ""itness not to -ans""er. (Tr. 13-18, 53-54)
~foreover,

there "~as in decedent's house in Brigham
City (occupied by John Bundy, decedent's son) a.t the
date of death a quantity of furniture which ''Jack''
claimed as a gift from his father. Jack's claim was
disputed by ~Irs. Bundy, who dispossessed the son, sold
part of the furniture (accounting to the estate for the
proceeds) and appropriated the rest to her own use.
At the time of the trial this furniture was in use in the
home Mrs. Bundy purchased for herself after the partial
distribution in August, 1947. This furniture was never
inventoried, appraised, or accounted for althoug-h she
testified she intended to have it distributed to her and
charged against her share of the estate. ( Tr. 77-80)
It was not so charged. (R 222)
Objectors offered in evidence a copy (the "best
evidence" rule being waiv·ed) of Decedent's intended last
will and testament signed by him less than a month before his death, by paragraph 2 of which he assumed to
dispose of "The home at 1432 25th Street in Ogden,
Utah, together with all furnishings (except the grand
piano which belongs to Dora B. Goddard)'' as his own
property. This was offered to prove Decedent's intent
and state of mind regarding his ownership of the furniture, etc. The Court, however, rejected the offer. ( Tr.
7-9) (Italics supplied.)

5
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It is interesting to note that Mr. Bundy, by paragraph 7 of this document, also attempted to dispose of
the ''Property'' at 531 So. 5th East Street, Brigham
City, as his own.
Immediately after the death of the decedent, the
heirs had a conference at the family home. Dora Goddard made some suggestions regarding counsel to be
retained, but Mrs. Bundy "insisted" that Mr. Holther
be called in, and that was done. ( Tr. 6, 25) He explained
that Mr. Goddard (Dora's husband) could ·not act as
co-administrator because of his non-residence and sug·gested that Mrs. Bundy act, advising that the administratrix would be under his guidance and would follow his
advice. Dora and Jack then signed a written consent
that Mrs. Bu;ndy be appointed administratrix, specifically waiving her ineligibility by reason of her being a
surviving partner of the decedent. (Apparently this
was prepared by Mr. Holther.) Dora does not recall
any mention made, or discussion had, regarding this
statutory ineligibility. (Tr. 9-10, 25-26, 38-39) This
document was never filed with the court, the petition
being based on respondent's right as surviving wife,
without mention of the partnership relation.
At the hearing, appellants offered to prove that
Mrs. Bundy, at the time they consented to her appointment, orally waived any claim for an administratrix
fee, but that w-as excluded by the court as not being
within the issues drawn. Appellants' motion for leave
to amend to present the issue was denied by the court,
and the testimony, admitted pro-forma, was stricken~
(Tr. 10-11)
6
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Letters of Administration 'vere issued to respondent on her petition on July 8, 1946.
On October 10, 1946, respondent paid to herself out
of the funds of the estate, $1000 as an ''advance''. On
December 30, 1946, she similarly paid to herself $1500,
and on April 12, 1947, $3300, as ''family allowance.''
(R 081)
Two weeks after this third payment, on April 29,
1947, she filed her verified petition for a family allowance. (R 033-035) Omitting the formal parts, the petition reads as follows :
"TO THE HONORABLE JUDGES OF THE
ABOVE ENTITLED COURT"
Your petitioner, Lovina R. Bundy, respectfully represents and shows :
I
That Ora Bundy died intestate on the 12th
day of June, 1946; that this honorable Court,
after proceedings duly and regularly had herein,
on the 8th day of July, 1946, appointed your
petitioner Administratrix of the estate of said
decedent; that your petitioner thereafter, and on
said same day, duly qualified as such Administratrix and Letters of Administration were duly
issued to her, and ever since that date your petitioner has been and now is the duly appointed,
qualified and acting Administratrix of the
Estate of the above named Ora Bundy, deceased.
II
That your petitioner is the surviving wife of
said decedent, and she, together with John A.
Bundy and Dora Goddard, are the sole and only
heirs at law of said decedent; that all of said
heirs at law are of legal age.

7
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III
That the estate of said decedent is solvent.

IV
That your petitioner has caused due notice
to creditors to be given for the time and in the
manner required hy law, and this Court on the
26th day of November, 1946, made and entered
its Decree showing that due and legal notice to
creditors has been given.

v

That all creditors claims presented have been
allowed and paid, and all of the expenses of the
last illness and burial of said deeedent, together
with taxes upon the real and personal property
of the estate, and the aecrued costs of probate
have been paid; that the inheritance taxes have
not yet been determined and fixed.

VI
That your petitioner is entitled, as the surviving wife, for such allowance for her maintenance and support as is reasonable under all cir·
cumstances to be paid to her for the period commencing with the date of the death of said decedent on June 12, 1946, and continuing during
the pendency of the administration of this estate;
and your petitioner verily believes, and so states
the fact to be, that such reasonable allowance is
$300.00 per month.
WHER.EFORE, your petitioner prays that
upon hearing after notice duly given this honorable Court make its order allowing and awarding the sum of $300.00 per month for her support
and maintenance during the administration of
said estate, and for such other and further order
as may he meet and proper in the premises.
/s/ Lovina R. Bundy
PETITIONER
/s/ David K. Holther
ATTORNEY FOR PETITIONER
8
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Notice of hearing· on ''the petition Lovina R. Bundy,
praying· for an order fixing- and allowing of family
allowance'' "~as giYen by mailing and posting notices.
(R 036-037) .A.s appears from the files, both of appellants have lived out of Weber County throughout the
administration.
Because of the confidence they reposed in their stepmother, the administ,ratrix, and her counsel (Tr. 20-22),
appellants did not attempt to press actively to determine
their rights or to· supervise the administration of the
estate. They expected a family allowance to be made.
(Tr 32-33) Under these circumstances they made no
appearance in respect to the petition for family allowance, and so on May 12, 1947, eleven months after
decedent's death, the pettition was granted, and the
court
'' ________ ORDERED that there be allowed and paid
to said widow, Lovina R. Bundy, for her support
and maintenance the sum of $300.00 per month,
beginning on the 12th day of June, 1946, and
continuing until the further order of the Court.''
(R

~2)

At that time no inventory had been filed. It was
not filed until June 21, 1947. (R 056-065) Nor did Mrs.
Bundy, either personally or as administratrix, disclose
to the court or to the heirs the fact that she had separately owned resources worth $40,900-more than half
the value of the entire estate as subsequently appraised.
It appears that the bulk of the assets in the partnership, Ora Bundy and Co., were liquidated in the partnership with ease and. expedition, for on February 30
( ~), 1947, the partnership paid the estate, on account
9
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of loans and advancements, $36,500, and on June 1, 1947,
there was $36,439.57 in c.ash in the partnership hank
account to pay the balanc.e of partnership obligations
and to pay a liquidating dividend. ( Tr 89, Objectors
Exh. 7) The partnership obligations were discharged
and the dividend paid on or about June 16, 1947. (Ibid.
and R 080) Mrs. Bundy received $5,282.12 in addition
to an advance of $2000 she had previously made to herself. (Ibid.) It should be observed, however, that on
June 21, 1947, she made a ''Refund'' of $1500 to the
estate.
Then, as hereinbefore stated, on August 27, 1947,
Mrs. Bundy received $10,000 in cash upon a partial
distribution of the estate. (R 161)
Mrs. Bundy paid herslf, during administration,
family allowance at the rate of $300 per month from
the date of decedent's death on June 12, 1946, until May
22, 1949, six days after filing her final account, a total
of $10,600 in addition to her other assets. (R 154)
It was stipulated that within 15 months after decedent's death the estate had on hand sufficient money
to pay all debts, costs and expenses of administration.
(Tr 4) Respondent's first account, verified August
13, 1947, shows cash rec.eipts of $69,000, and disbursements of less than $18,000 (R 080-082), with a
cash balance in excess o.f $51,000.
As early as June 9, 1947, counsel for tbe respondent wrote the heirs that if taxes payable by the estate
are ''definitely determined soon, then I will likely recommend final distribution rather than a partial distribution, and have those assets which we are finding
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difficult to liquidate distributed in kind, so the estate
can be closed and the bond terminated and the work of
liquidation of questionable assets can be continued after
the close of the estate.'' (Objectors Exh. 7)
The estate, however, 'vas not closed. The administration "~as continued, and petition for final distribution v.Tas not filed until nearly two years later, on
May 16, 1949. (R 153-164)
In the meantime respondent continued her family
allowance.
The Utah State Inheritance tax was paid June 10,
1948, just one year later. The Federal Estate tax was
not paid until ~larch 1, 1949·, although under the law
it was due September 12, 1947, and presumably bore
interest at 6% from that date as provided by law.
So far as we have been able to find, the respondent has nowhere made or attempted an explanation or
excuse for this long delay in paying the taxes due, which
counsel indicated was the only reason for delaying
final distribution. Her only explanation for delay in
closing the estate was that an agreement as to the manner of distribution could not be reached (Tr 80) and
that because she feared a lawsuit concerning certain
partnership dealing with one Holmes. (Tr 101-102, 9395) The Holmes deal was financed by the partnership
(Tr 95) and hence was a partnership venture.
There is nothing in the record to show that the situation in May of 1949 when respondent asked for distribution was substanially different from the situation
obtaining· when partial distribution was had in 1947.
Two or three additional items had been sold in the'
11
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two year period, and the partnership had paid the estate
an additional liquidating dividend of some $2400, but
there w-ere still on harnd a n;umber of unliquidated items
of substantial value, both in the estate an.d in the part·
nership'. (R 160-164, Tr. 73-74) These were, on April29,
19,50, in fact distributed in kind as contemplated by
counsel's suggestion of June 9, 1947. (R 220-225) No
reason has been given by the respondent as to why this
could not have been done in the first place.
Dora Goddard did not know the amount of the
family allowance until January of 1948, an earlier inquiry having failed to get that information. (Tr 18-19)
She assumed it would be automatically discontinued
when distribution was made. (Tr 19) In August of
1948 she learned for the first time that the administratrix was continuing to pay herself family allowance.
Perceiving that this was depleting her share and
her brother's share of the esta.te, she began to urge the
early closing of the estate. ( Tr 20) On September 3,
1948 she wrote counsel for the administratrix as fol·
lows:
''Am wondering what's transpiring. The time
element thus far involved would certainly seem
adequate I should imagine. Should appreciate
having some word from either of you. Meanwhile the estate must be dwindling at least as
far as sustenance goes.''
( Tr 20, Objectors Exhibit 2)
Dora. did not earlier press for a closing of the estate
because she relied on Mr. Hoi ther to handle things properly, and had eonfidence that Mrs. Bundy would do
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the right thing. She also felt some delicacy in pressing
for her legal rig·hts because of the family relationship.
(Tr 20-23)
Begining as early as April 19, 1948, there had been
some negotiation among· the heirs with a view to carrying out the 'vishes of the decedent as expre'Ssed by him
in a will invalid because of improper execution. (Exhibit 1) On December 5, 1948, Dora wrote Mr. Holther
reviewing· this negotiation, pointing OUt thnt thP nelay
was not Dora's and advising· that she and Jack would settle the matter either by following her father's wishes,
''or by settling the estate immediately under the Law of
Succession.'' She added, ''I ~ave been wondering_ about
the statute of limitations on widow's allowance, and on
the debts owed the estate. What is the law in Utah regarding these two points." (Tr 21-24)
The family allowance nevertheless continued.
Then, on April 30, 1949, Mr. Holther mailed to the
three heirs a proposal for distribution with proposed
adjustments. (Adm. Exhibit B, Tr 36-37) The letter
was introduced in evidence by respondent. It proposed
that real estate previously distributed to Mrs. Bundy
referred to in the proposal at ''Property No. 1 '' be
charged against her share at a value of $450. In view
of the fact that this land adjoined the tract standing in
her name, and wa'S part of the "home lot" which she
subsequently sold, with the improvements, for $17,900,
this seemed only fair to appellants. They were satisfied with this part of the proposal and indeed did not
apprehend that the charge would not be made as proposed, even though the court appraisal was for only

13
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

$100, and the inheritance tax appraisal was $250.
Because of this proposal no issue was tendered by them
on the valuation thereof for purposes of distribution.
It is to be observed that this last proposal still included some beneficiaries other than the heirs at law.
On May 13, 1949, Mr. Holther sent to the heirs a
copy of the Final Aecount and Petition for Final Distribution. (Tr 35-36, Adm. Exhibit A) In the covering
lettering the adjustment of inventory values for purposes of distribution was discussed, and it was stated
that in the absence of an agreement among the heirs
the court would give each heir one-third of each kind of
property, deducting the advances to Jack ''and deducting the value of the ten foot strip of land to Mrs. Bundy.''
(Adm. Exh. A p·. 2) (Italics supplied)
Upon receipts of this communication, Dora Goddard, who had never received a copy of the first account
(Tr 38, 42), wired for and received from Mr. Holther a
copy thereof. (Tr 42-43, Obj. Exh. 6, Adm. Exh. C)
After studing the accountings, Dora retained counsel, and on May 30, 1949, she wrote Mr. Holther the let.
ter, Objectors Exhibit 5. (Tr 37) In that letter, among
other things, she said:
''In reviewing the papers, we noted that Lovina
has applied for the family allowance right up to
the last day and we were surprised that some sort
of an adjustment hadn't been made in view of
the fact that there has certainly been unnecessary delay in settling the estate. Also, the par~
tial distribution gave her financial relief which
in itself would have some ~earing on the con-

14
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

tinuance of the family allowance. We all know
that the estate could have been easily closed much
sooner, and the fact that it has been held up for
three years does not appe~ar to justify a full allowance for the entire period. As our knowledge of estate legal proceedings is of course
limited, I ·w. rote you on December 4, 1948, and
asked what limitations there were on the family
allowance, and debts owed the estate. I received
no reply to this letter. ''
In that letter she also noted the proposal to charge
Lovina $450 for the property distributed to her and
sold as a part of her home, and she outlined briefly her
efforts to obtain, and respondent's resistence to an early
distribution. It is app-arent that Mr. Holther had for
some time been trying to bring his client into agreement with the other heirs as to some extra-legal distribution, but that she changed her mind each time that
agreement seemed imminent, and so delayed distribution.
(Tr. 48-50)
Upon being retained, counsel for appellants sought
for ~d obtained an order continuing the hearing on
respondent's account and petition to June 27, 1949, and
authorizing the filing of formal objections in the meantime. (R 168-169)
On ·June 27, 1949, the matter was continued to July
5th, and on July 5th, was continued to July 26, 1949, for
hearing.
On July 8, 1949, appellants filed their OBJECTIONS TO ACCOUNTS OF ADMINISTRATRIX,
AND CROSS PETITION. (R 173-180) Omitting the
formal parts, that pleading reads as follows:
·
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''Come now John A. Bundy and Dora B. Godda.rd, son and daughter respectively of the above
named dec.edent, and contest and object to the
allowance· of the second and final ac.count and report and petition for final distribution of Lovina
R. Bundy, as administratrix of the estate of Ora
Bundy, desea.sed, filed herein on the 16th day of
May, 1949·, and for causes of contest and objections and for cross-petition against her allege
as follows:
~- The contestants and objectors are the only

children of the decedent Ora Bundy and with the
surviving widow, Lovina R. Bundy, are the sole
heirs-at-law of said decedent. The said Lovina R.
Bundy is and at all times herein mentioned was
the stepmother of the contestants and the surviving widow of the decedent. As such surviving
widow her personal interests are, and at. all times
during the administration of the estate of said
decedent they have been in conflict _with her duties as administratrix of the estate of said decedent as will hereinafter more particularly app.ear.
2. The final account filed by said administratrix
is incorrect in the following particulars, to-wit:
A. By said a.ceounting, to which referenc.e is hereby made, the said administratrix claims credit for
family allowance in the sum of $10,600.00 paid to
herself as surviving widow of the decedent during
the term covered by said accounting and said expenditure for the reasons hereinafter alleged
is not proper, is not authorized in law and is excessive and unreasonable.
B. By said accountfug and petition the said administratrix seeks to be allowed commissions as
compensation for services as administratrix of
the estate of said decedent in the sum of One
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Thousand Seven Hundred Thirty Six and 56/100
Dollars ($1,736.56), the granting of which contestants object to for the reason that said administratrix is not entitled to the same or any part
therof and for the further reason that the same
is excessive because said administratrix has not
faithfully discharged her trust in the manner required by la"'" and has not earned said commissions and by her violations of duty imposed by
law· and by improper expenditures she has fore- ·
feited all right to said compensation and comcommission all as is hereinafter more particularly
alleged.
3. The said administratrix after proceedings
duly and regularly had in the above entitle matter
was on the 8th day of July, 1946, duly appointed
administratrix of the estate of Ora Bundy, the
above named decedent, and she theTeupon qualified as such administratrix and letters of administration issued to her and thence hitherto she has
been and now is the duly qualified and acting
administratrix of said es,ta te.
4. The said Lovina R. Bundy as the surviving
wife of the decedent and as the administratrix
of his estate, filed herein, on the 29th day of
April, 1947, her petition for family allowance to
herself as such widow in the sum of Three Hundred and 00/100 Dollars ($300.00 per month alleging that such allowance was reasonable to be paid
her for the period commencing with the date of
the death of decedent on June 12, 1946, and continuing during the pendency of the administration of said estate. The said petition for family
allowance does not state facts sufficient to entitle
the said Lovina R. Bundy to the family allowance
prayed for therein or any sum whatever.
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5. The said administratrix in the discharge of
her trust was then and there under the duty to
oppose the granting of any unnecessary or unreasonable family allowance except homestead
rights and pursuant thereto was then and there
under the further duty of reporting to this court
any and all separate property or income owned
or possessed by her.
6. At the time of the death of said decedent and
at all times thence hitherto the said Lovina R.
Bundy had and she now has separate property
and income of great and substantial value. The
said property and income at the time of his death
consisted of a residential property used by her
as a home of the probable vlue in excess of Eight
Thousand Five Hundred and 00/100 Dollars ($8,500.00), United States Series E Bonds and United
States Series G. Bonds in the joint names of said
Lovina R. Bundy and of decedent of the value of
$5,915.50, an interest in the co-partnership of
Ora Bundy and Company of the fair value of
Eleven Thousand and 00/100 Dollars ($11,000.00)
and of miscellaneous death claims upon policies
of life insurance upon the life of said decedent
designating her as sole beneficiary, the total
amount of which is unknown to the contestants
but which they are imformed and believe and
therefore allege to be a very large sum. In addition thereto as contestants are informed and believe and therefore state the fact to be the said
Lovina R. Bundy was at the time of the death of
said decedent, the owner and in possession of
other real and personal property of a great and
substantial value, the exact amount of which is
not known to these contestants.
7. Notwithstanding the said duties and in violation thereof a.nd in violation of the duties of her
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said trust n s administratrix the said lJovina R.
Bundy failed and neg-lected to report to the court
at the time of th~ filing· of said petition or at the
hearing thereon or at any time thereafter the existance or the value of any of the said property
or income and by the said violation of her said
duties aJld by her failure to dis.close and report
to the c.ourt the existance and value of the said
property and income she procured the court on
the 12th day of 1\lay, 1947, to make and enter
an order for family allowance allowing to said
Lovina R. Bundy as widow of the decedent, for
her support and maintenance the sum of Three
Hundred and 00/100 Dollars ($300.00) per month
beginning on the 12th day of June, 1946 and continuing until the further order of the court. As
contestants are informed and believe and therefore state the fact to be the said order was inadvertently made by the court without knowledge
of any of the said. property or income of said
widow and said order would not have been made
had the s.aid administratrix in eompliance with
her said duties reported to and informed the
court of her said separate property and income.
8. Pursuant to the said order the said Lovina R. Bundy has paid to herself the entire
amount of family allowance accruing under the
said order so inadvertently made amounting in
all to the ·sum of $10,600.00, all as shown by the
first account, and the said second and final account of said administratri~ on file herein to
which reference is hereby made, and the said
Lovina R. Bundy personally has thereby profited
by her breach of duty and her breach of trust
and it would be unjust and improper to allow her
to retain the family allowance so paid to her out
of the property of the estate of said decedent.
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9. Thereafter and on the 27th day of August,
1947, the said Lovina R. Bundy as the widow and
heir of the decedent acquired as her further separate property the sum of Ten Thousand and
00/100 Dollars ($10,000.00) in money by a partial
distribution of the property of this estate pursuant to the order for partial distribution made and
entered herein on said day. By reason of the
receipt of the said money as aforesaid it thereupon became unnecessary and unreasonable, if it
had ever been neces-sary or reasonable, for the
said Lovina R. Bundy to receive or to be paid
any further family allowance out of the estate of
said decedent. It thereupon became and it 'vas
and ever since then it has been the duty of the
said Lovina R. Bundy as administratrix of said
estate in the performance of her trust and for
the purpose of preserving the assets of said estate for those beneficially interested therein to
report to _and call to the attention of the court
the fact of her acquisition and receipt of said
money upon the partial distribution and the fact
that it was no longer necessary or reasonable,
if it had ever been necessary or reasonable, for
a family allowance to he· paid to her as widow of
said decedent in the sum of Three Hundred and
00/100 Dollars ($.300.00) per month Dr in any
other sum. It thereupon became and was and
ever since has been the further duty of said administratrix as it had been her duty from the
firs~t to discontinue paying to herself as widow
of said decedent the sum of Three Hundred and
00!100 .Dollars ($300.00) per month or in any
other sum as family .allowance.
10. Notwithstanding the duties aforesaid of
said administratrix and in violation thereof and
in violation of her trust as such administratrix
said Lovina R. Bundy failed and neglected to
20
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report or to eall to the attention of the court the
fact of her receipt of the said Ten Thousand and
00/100 Dollars ( $10,000.00) or the fact tha:t it wa~s
no longer reasonable or necessary that she pay
to herself as widow of the decedent any family
allowance, and failed and neglected to dis.continue paying to herself family allowances as
aforesaid, but on the contrary she continued in
violation of her said duties and her said trust to
pay to herself family allowance in the sum of
Three Hundred and 00/100 Dollars ($300.00) per
month until the filing of the final account herein.
By reason of the facts aforesaid the said Lovina
R. Bundy has unjustly enriched herself at the expense of the trust estate in the su~ of $10,600.00
and it would be unjust and improper for this
court to permit said Lovina R. Bundy to retain
said moneys or to claim credit upon her s.aid accounting for the payment the-reof or of any part
thereof.
11. As contestants are informed and believe
and therefore state the fact to be, this court, if the
said facts had been reported to it or called to its
attention, would have cancelled and terminated
the order for family allowance theretofore procured by Lovina R. Bundy as aforesaid and would
have ordered that no further payments of family
allowance be made.
12. By reason of the failure of the said Lovina R. Bundy as administratrix to report or call
to the attention of the court the facts aforesaid
she imposed upon the court and these objectors
all of whom are and have been entitled to repose
trust and confidence in her as such administratrix
and as the stepmother of these objectors, and she
thereby wrongfully procured the continuance in
effect of the order for family allowance and
benefited thereby at the expense of her trust.
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13. The time for presentation of creditors'
claims to said administratrix expired on the 11th
day of November, 1946. By March 1, 1947, there
were ample funds in the hands of the administratrix for the payment of all debts due by the
estate. By the exercise of reasonable diligence
or of any diligence at all the said administratrix
would have been able to complete the administration of said estate, file her final accounts, procure an order of final distribution and distribute
the estate not later than September 12, 1947
fifteen (15) months after the date of the death
of the decedent, and it was the duty of the said
administratrix to bring such administration to
a close and settle her accounts and distribute said
estate among the heirs of the decedent not later
than said date. It was for the benefit and advantage of said Lovina R. Bundy personally to
prolong the administration of the said estate and
to continue to receive family allowance during·
the prolonged administration thereof.
14. Notwithstanding the duties of said administratrix and in violation thereof said administratrix failed and neglected to· exercise
reasonable diligence or any diligence in and about
the administration of said estate or to bring the
administration thereof to a close and procure
distribution, but on the contrary in violation of
her said trust and of her said duties and to her
own personal profit and benefit the· said administratrix purposely delayed and prolonged the
administration of said estate beyond the said 12th
day of September, 1947, and beyond any reasonable time for the completion of such administration for the purpose, as the objectors are informed and believe and therefore state the fact
22
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

to be of profiting at the expense of her said trust
by the continuation of the payment to her of family allowance as aforesaid.
15. As objectors are informed and believe
and therefore state the fact to be the said administratrix Lovina R. Bundy has not performed the
"\York and services incident to her office and the
administration of the estate of said decedent but
said work and services have been performed by
counsel for the administratrix for which compensation has been claimed and will he paid out of
the assets of s.aid estate and by accountants employed by said administratrix and paid out of
the assets of said estate.
WHEREFORE, objeetors and -contestants
pray that said account of the administratrix Lovina R. Bundy be rejected and that said administratrix be required to render a true account of
her administration within a reasonable time fixed
by the court and that the court adjudge and de,..
clare that said administratrix is not entitled to
any credit for family allowance paid to herself
as widow of the decedent out of decedent's estate
and that said administratrix is not entitled to
receive any -commission or compensation for services as administratrix in the administration of
said estate or otherwise and that the court charge
s.aid administratrix with all sums heretofore paid
by her to herself as family allowance as the widow
of said decedent and order and require the said
administratrix to refund to the estate of the decedent all sums s.o paid with interest thereon at
six per cent (6%) per annum from the dates of
the payments thereof and the contestants and
objectors have judgment against the administratrix for their costs of court herein.
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Objectors and contestants pray for such
other and further relief as may be just and equitable in the premises.
/s/ Thatcher & Young
AttoJ1neys for Contesltants
and Objectors
Through inadvertance, a copy thereof was not delivered
to Mr. Holther until July 21, 1949.
On July 28, 1949, respondent filed her MOTION
AND NOTICE OF MOTION TO STRIKE the Objections, and her general DEMURRER thereto. (R 184185)
Omitting the formal parts, the Motion is as follows:
''TO JOHN A. BUNDY AND DORA B. GODDARD, Contestants and Objectors, and to THATCHER & YOUNG, E!sqs., their attorneys:
y;ou and each of you will please take notice
and you are hereby notified that on Tuesday the
26th day of July, 1949, at the hour of 2:00
o'clock P. M. of said day or as soon thereafter as
counsel can be heard, in the above entitled Court,
in the Court Room of Department No. 1, thereof,
in the Municipal Building in Ogden City, Weber
County, Utah, Lovina R. Bundy, the Administratrix herein, will and she does hereby move
the above entitled Court to strike from the files
and records of the .above entitled matter that
c.ertain instrument denominated ''Objections to
Accounts of Administratrix and Cross-Petition"
filed herein the 8th day of July, 1949, upon the
grounds and for the reason that:
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1. The same "'"as not served upon counsel for
the Administratrix of the above entitled estate
"'"ithin the time allo,Yed by law and the time allowed by the Court therefor.
Said motion "'"ill be made and based on this
notice of motion and upon the pleading·s, papers,
records and files in this action.
Dated this 23rd day of July, 1949.
/s/ David K. Holther
ATTORNEY FOR ADMINISTRATRIX
Service acknowledged and copy hereof received this 26th day of July, 1949.
THATCHER & YOUNG
By /s/ Roy D. Thatcher
Attorneys for Contestants
and Objectors
The demurrer and motion having been argued and
submited, the court made a minute order overruling the
demurrer, but striking certain p-ortions only of appellants' objections and cross petition. (See the Supplementary Record tendered herewith for filing.) No for- ·
mal order thereon was ever made or filed, but the minute order the court struck from the objections all of
paragraph 2B thereof, and all of paragraphs 4, 5, 6 and
8 thereof. (Ibid.)
On October 3, 1949, respondent filed her ANSWER
TO OBJECTIONS TO ACCOUNTS OF ADMINISTRATRIX AND CROSS PETITION. (R 189-191)
Omitting formal parts, it is as follows:
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''Comes now Lovina. R. Bundy, Adinistratrix
herein, and answering the Objections to Accounts
of Administratrix and Cross Petition, filed herein, as required by the Court, -says :
I
Answering the allegations of paragraph 1
thereof, admits the contestants and objector~
are the only children of the decedent Ora Bundy
and with the surviving widow, Lovina R. Bundy'
are the sole heirs-at-law of said decedent. That
said Lovina R. Bundy is and at all times herein
mentioned wa,s the step-mother of the contestants and the surviving widow of the decedent.

Denies all other allegations in said paragraph contained.
II
Answering the allegations of parapraph 2A.,
thereof, admits that by the final account filed
by said Administratrix, she claims credit for family allowance in the sum of $10,600.00 paid to
herself as surviving widow of the decedent during the term covered by said accounting and
from the death of her husband.

Denies all other allegations in said paragraph contained.

III
Answering the allegations of paragraph 3,
thereof, admits the allegations therein contained.

IV
Answering the allegations of paragraph 7,
thereof, admits the Court, on the 12th of May,
1947, made and entered an order for family allowance allowing to said Lovina R. Bundy, as
widow of the decedent, for her support and maintenance, the sum of Three Hundred and 00/100
26
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Dollars ($300.00) per month beginning on the
12th day of June, 19±6, and continuing· until the
further order of the Court.
Denies all other allegations in said paragraph contained.

v
Ans,vering the allegations of paragraph 9,
thereof, admits and alleges that on the 27th day
of August, 1947, the Court ordered partial distribution of the property of this estate and thereby, and pursuant thereto, $10,000.00 in money
was distributed to each of the heirs of this estate.
Denies all other allegations in said paragraph contained.

VI
Answering the allegations of paragraph 10,
thereof, denies all allegations in ·said paragraph
contained.
-

VII
Answering the allegations of paragraph 11,
thereof, denies all allegations in said paragraph
contained.

VIII
Answering the allegations of paragraph 12,
thereof, denies all allegations in said paragraph
contained.

IX
Answering the allegations of paragraph 13,
thereof, admits the time for presentation of creditors claims to said administratrix expired on
the 11th day of November, 1946. By March 1
1947, there were ample funds in the hands of the
administratrix for the payment of all debts by
the estate.
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Denies all other allegations In said para~
gra.ph contained.
X
Answering the allegations of paragraph 14
thereto, denies all allegations therein contained:

XI
Answering the allegations of paragraph 15
thereof, denies all allegations therein contained:
WHEREFORE, answering party prays
that said Objections to Accounts of Administratrix and Cross Petition he dismissed; and for
such other and further relief as is meet in the
prem1ses.
/s/ Lovina R. Bundy
ADMINISTRATRIX OF THE ESTATE OF ORA BUNDY, DE~
CEASED
/s/ David K. Holther
AT·TORNEY FOR ADMINISTRATRIX
Thereafter, by stipulation, appellants filed an
amendment to their Objections and Cross Petition, add~
ing threto an additional paragraph 16, reading as follows:
'' 16. The said administratrix has not inventoried or accounted for all of the property of
the estate of said decedent and in particular she
not inventoried or accounted for certain household furniture, furnishings, equipment and sup~
plies, the property of the decedent Ora Bundy,
which the objectors are informed and believe
is of great and substantial value, the exact market value thereof not being within the knowledge
of the objectors.''
By stipulation this was deemed denied by the admin·
istratrix. (R 195-196)
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The trial

"\Yns

had on the issues so drawn.

However, in the meantime the Honorable John A.
Hendricks, the judg·e before "\Yhom the matter was pending, happened to oYerhear some gossip intimating that
that appellant John .;._\. Bundy, an heir and a. eo-partner
in Ora Bundy and Co., W'"as not properly accounting to
the partnership for its property and funds in his hands.
(S Tr. 21-23} On the Court's own motion a citation wa.s
. issued requiring him to appear and answer concerning
the property of the estate ''and property and interests
of said estate in Ora Bundy and Co." (R 187-188)
He appeared on August 8, 1949, in answer to the
citation, and was .extensively cross examined by the
Court and by counsel for the administratrix. (See the
''Supplemental Transcript'') It there appeared that
''Jack'' had been working actively in the partnership
during his father's lifetime, and for a short time fol.lowing his death continued to be active as a partner in
dealing with the property. It appeared that business
records were loosely kept, and formal bookkeeping was
not the practice in the operations in which he participated. (S Tr 16) However, it was not made to appear that he had received any money or property for
which he had not accounted. On the contrary, it affirmatively appeared that on August 10, 1946, there was an
account stated in writing between Jack and Mr. Holther
and it was found that there· was a balance of $862.50
due the partnership, which Jack settled by authorizing
this sum to he charged against his 20% share of the
partnership assets, which was done. (S Tr. 13-18 Admx.
Exh. "A; filed August 8, 1949, following R ~87) Mr. Holther, as appears from his correspondence in evidence,
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was counsel for the partnership as well as for the estate,
and the statement of account of August 10, 1946, is
partly in his, and partly in J ask's handwriting. Jack
testified postively that he had not received any partnership moneys which had not been "turned in." (S.
Tr 18) There is no evidence to contradiate it.
When these circumstances appeared and the Court
was unable to give counsel the names of the possible
witnesses whose gossip he had heard, the Court stated,
in effect, that he would leave further action ''up to the
estate.'' ( S. Tr 23) No action was taken by the estate.
The issues on appellant's objections and the answer
thereto were tried in February, 1950. At the trial the
facts were made to appear, as appellants view it, substantially as hereinbefore outlined. On several occasions during the trial the Court made comments to the
effect that Jack had, in the Court's opinion, received
his full share· of the estate by reason of his dealings
with the partnership. On one such occasion counsel
for respondent made a statement to the Court with
respect to that situation which the Reporter unfortunately did not record, apparently regarding it as argument.
Respondent's eounsel recalls making the statement,
and has been invited to reconstruct it for the record,
but has declined, as he feels the matter was too remote
in time for him to reconstruct it accurately without taking some time for reflection. He has, however, suggested
tha.t the writer he free to state here his recollection,
and that counsel would, if his recollection varied, then
attempt to restate it in respondent's brief. With some
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hesitation the 'vritPr follo,vs that suggestion, feeling tha.t
the statement IS Yery material in view of the Court's
findings.
The "rriter 's recollection is that respondent's counsel stated, in substance and effect, that the problem of
Jack' dealings in partnership property and money had
from an early time been a matter of much concern to him
and to Mrs. Bundy, and that they had diligently pursued the matter through every approach which appeared
available; that they had had numerous c.onferences with
Jack on the subject, and had obtained from him the admissions contained in the statement of aecount introduced in evidence in the hearing on the citation in August of 1949 ; that they were not satified that Jack had
made a full accounting, and, like the Court, believed tha.t
he was further indebted to the partnership, but that, in
view of the lack of records and their inability to find
any other evidence, or any witnesses, they were unable
to present legal proof of their suspicions ; that the entire
matter had been explored at the hearing on the citation,
without avail, and that nothing more had been found
since then, so that the administratrix was not in a postion to pursue the matter.
At the conclusion of the trial, the matter was taken
under advisement, and on April 24, 1950, the Court made
and filed his "Memorandum Decree" (R 205-210) deciding every issue in favor of Respondent, and, further,
depriving Jack of the balance of his share of the estate,
and directing distribution of the entire residue to Mrs.
Bundy and Dora in equal shares, after allowing for advancements. Counsel for Re.spondent promptly prepared formal findings and decree and_ submitted them
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to the Court, without however Berving them on adverse
Counsel prior to submission. On April 29, 1950, the
Court Bigned and filed the Findings and the Decree.
(R. 211-225).
The Court found (Findings, paragraph 3, R. 212):
''That on the 29th day of May, 1947 she
filed herein inventories and appraisements ~bow
ing all of the estate of said deceased which had
c.ome to her knowledge and possession; said inventories and appraisements totalled $81,726.52.
That the furniture, furnishings and equipment
of the home of the Administratrix and in possession of Lovina R. Bundy, at the time of the
death of said decedent, were purchased, in part,
by Lovina R. Bundy, with her separate funds acquired by inheritance from her father's estate
and accumulated prior to her marriage, and were
all joint property, and such did not, and does
not, constitute any part of the property of this
estate, and was properly, therefore, not inventoried as property of this estate.''
The Court, in paragraph 4 of its findings, (R. 212213) upon the issue of family allowance, found:
' 'That on the 12th day of May, 1947, this
Court made and entered it's Order for Family
Allowance, pursuant to verified petition therefor
and after notice and hearing. That the petition
therefor wa.s sufficient to satisfy the requirementh of the statute and the sum of $300.00 per
month, allowed by said Order, was reasonable
and eom.mensurate with the status of the widow,
her mode of life in the community, and with the
size of the estate and the allowance, and the
amount, were the exereise of the sound discretion
of the Court. That both of the objectors had due,
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leg·al and sufficient notice of the hearing on said
petition, kne",. ",.hat action the Court took thereon, and of the amount the Court granted; and
each objector received copies of the first account·
and report and petition for partial distribution
and Dora B. Goddard and her husband, Grant
Goddard, an accountant, duly examined such
account and kne"\v exactly what ·sum had been allowed to the ·widow; that the objectors were in
a position to know, and did know, that the family allowance was to be continued to the settle·
ment of the estate.
That Lovina R. Bundy and Ora Bundy, the
deceased, were married in 1926, and at that time
the objectors, Dora B. Goddard and Jack Bundy,
children of the deceased by a prior marriage,
were ten and eight years of age, respectively, and
were thereafter, raised in the home of Lovina R.
Bundy and her now deceased husband, Ora
Bundy; that the major portion of decedent's estate was accumulated during the married life of
the deceased and his now widow, and at his death
the major portion of his estate consisted of his
interest in the Ora Bundy & Co. ; that in the
course of the administration of this estate·, the
widow did not as~sert her homestead exemption,
nor did she ask for separate compensation for
winding up the affairs of the Ora Bundy & Co.,
partnership, to which she would have been en:..
titled to on a separate action for winding up the
affairs of the partnership and her thus handling
of such affairs reduced the- amount of the attorney's fees and the handling of the affairs of the
estate and of the partnership, together, was advantageous to the heirs; that the allowance of,
and approval of, the p,ayment of family allowance to the widow up to the time of the filing of

33
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

the second and final ac.count by the Administratrix, is within the exercise of the sound discretion of the Court and the Court finds it reasonable to allow and approve such payment as
provided in said accounts and reports.''
The Court found that the value of the 10 foot strip
of land previously distributed to Mrs. Bundy was ''as
appraised, to-wit, $100.00" (R. 214, paragraph 8), and
concluded she should be charged therewith at that value.
(R. 219).
By paragraph 15 of the findings (R. 216) the Court
found:
''That the ordinary commission allowed to
the Administratrix by }aw amounts to the sum of
$1, 736.56, and none of such commission has been
paid. That the Administratrix has rendered
services herein, has fulfilled her duty as such,
has made neither improper nor excessive expenditures of the estate's money, and has timely
performed all services herein with due dillig-ence.
That said sum is rea~sonable.''
By paragraph 19 of the findings (R 216-217) the
Court found:
''That in the lifetime of decedent, decedent
formed Ora Bundy & Co., a partnership, giving
to his widow, son and daughter, shares therein.
Such company conducted a gravel pit operation
at Brigham City, Utah. Deceased also had purchased a large stock of war surplus goods and
was disposing of them at the· time of his death
under an oral agreement with one, Robert Holme~s. T·ha.t just prior to the death of deceased,
the gravel pit was. sold, and much of the equipment; some of the real estate was still retained.
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There 'vas a large number of outstanding accounts. The affairs of the comp~any and the- estate were so intermingled that it appeared to be
to the best interest of all that the affair-s of both
be settled in one operation, so far as this could
be done. Upon the appointment of the Administratrix, she immediately took over and attempted to collect accounts, dispose of the remaining· equipment and property and the war
surplus merchandise that was on hand. She
found that there was no written record as to the
agreement between decedent and Robert Holmes,
that the accounts had been poorly kept, and after
the death of decedent, through the connivance of
Robert Holmes and objector John A. Bundy,
what records there were, were destroyed or otherwis.e hidden. The objector, John A. Bundy, not
only refused to cooperate with the Administra.trir in settling the affairs of the estate and the
company, but rather connived in most every way
possible in hindering the settlement of the affairs of the estate and company. According to
his own testimony, he converted funds, equipment,
and money received from the accounts, to his
own use. The exact amount of his conversions
has never been, and perhaps never will, he found
out. Said objector further neglected and refused
to make accountings to the estate and company
of his defalcations.
Because of his defalcations. and general conduct, the Court finds the objector, John A. Bundy,
to be without standing in Court and not in a position to challenge the acts of the Administratrix.
The Court further finds. that the objector,
John A. Bundy, has received all the property
from the estate that is due him, and perhaps
more than he is actually entitled to, by reason
of his obstructing policies and his conversions.
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The objector, Dora B. Goddard, and her bushand, a certified public accountant, live in University City, Missouri; they have been of little
or no assistance to the Administratrix in the
conduct of the affairs and closing of the estate.''
The decree (R. 220-225) was entered in accordance
with the findings and eonelusions and cut Jack Bundy
off from any participation in the balance of the assets
in his father's estate, approved the accounting as rendered and distributed the balanee of money and other·
asset·s to Mrs. Bundy and Dor~a Goddard in equal shares,
charging Mrs. Bundy only $100.00 for the 10 foot strip
of real property in question.
On April 26, 1950, w~ile counsel for Respondent
was preparing the proposed findings and decree he
advised counsel for Appellants that it was his intention
to charge Mrs. Bundy only $100.00 for the land in question. Counsel for Appellants then informed him that
he desired to pre.sent to the court at suitable times representation that said land should he eharged at a value
of $450.00 in accordance with a. proposal for distribution
(Administrator's Eochibit B) introdueed in evidence at
the trial and if necessary, to have the case reopened in
order to establish the true value of the property at the
time of the distribution. (R 235 and 244-245). Because
there is an unfortunate divergence in the recollection of
·c.ounsel for Respondent and the writer we do not press
some other matters ineluded in the papers filed in the
court below. However, counsel for Appellants relied
upon the rule requiring the Clerk of the Court to mail
a copy of the finding.s and conclusions and judgment
entered immediately upon their entry and took no action
at that time in the matter, expeeting to make suitable
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representations to the Court in presence of counsel a.t
such time as the Court proposed to settle its findings or
moYe to amend the finding-s and judgment in ac.cordanc.e
with the Rules of t'iiYil Procedure 'vithin ten days afte-r
the entry. During all of the time counsel for Appellants
,Yas under g-reat business pressure and engaged in arranging the affairs of his office to leave the City and
State for the trial of a lawsuit of great importance then
pending in the Federal Court of the· District of Idaho.
On the 6th of 1Iay, 19·50, he wa.s compelled to leave Ogden
for Pocatello for preparation and trial of the lawsuit
and was compelled to remain at Pocatello until Thursday, May 11, 1950, when he learned for the first time
in a conversation with Mr. Holther that the findings,
conclusions and decree had been signed and that no copies had been mailed by the Clerk as required by the rules.
On that same evening counsel for Appellants was compelled again to leave Ogden for the trial of the lawsuit
in Pocatello and was compelled to be continuously absent
until the evening of May 20, 1950, whereupon he proceeded diligently to prepare a motion for an order relieving Appellants of their default upon the ground
above summarized and for leave to file motions for
amendment of the findings and dec.ree and Motion for
New Trial. This motion with supporting affidavit and
the proposed motions for amendment and for new trial
were filed and tendered to the Court on May 22, 1950.
(R 227-237).
Respondent, through her counsel, filed an answer to
the motion for relief with supporting affidavit. (R 238246). The matter was heard on May 29, 1950, and the
Court entered its minute order denying the motion for
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relief and for leave to file motion for amendment. Thereupon and on the same day and within one month from
the date of the entry of the original decree the principle
appeal herein was perf eeted by the filing of the Notice
of Appeal with the cost bond as required by the Rules
of Procedure. The formal order for motion for relief
was not made and entered until June 13, 1950. (R 272).
On the 15th of June, 1950, Appellants duly filed a supplemental notice. of appeal to bring up before the Court
for review the order of the Court denying the Appellants' motion for an order relieving default and for
leave to file their motions for amendment of findings
and decree and for new trial. (R 275).
Notwithstanding the initiation of this appeal, no
stay bond having been filed, the Respondent proceeded
to make distribution in accordance with the decree of
the Court from which the appeal was taken. Dora Goddard declined to .accept the one-half ·Share of the residue
, because the decree having been appealed from was not
final and she felt some adjustment was necessary. The
Respondent then paid Dora's half to the Clerk of the
Court to be held subject to the Court's order and paid
to herself her one-half as the surviving widow under
the decree of distribution. Respondent then, over Ap·
pellants' obje-ctions, procured her final discharge as
as administratrix. (R 250-275).
In conclusion of the statement of facts it is perhaps
intere:Sting to know that the Appellunts' step-mother,
who was never gainfully employed after her marriage
and who before decedent''8 death had spent the $3,000.00
received by inheritance from her father, found herself
at the conclusion of her administration of the estate for

88
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

the benefit of her stepchildren, "rith separate and survivorship property 'vorth approximately $±0,000.00, with
"~idow's allo,vance paid over a period of three years in
the sum of $10,600.00, a partial distribution some fifteen
months after her husband's death in the sum of $10,000.00, an administratrix fee in excess of $1,700.00 (R 221),
a final cash distribution in excess of $4,000.00 (R 222),
and United States Bonds of a maturity value in excess
of $2,800.00, together with land in Beaver County appraised in excess of $300.00, a. total of $69,400.00. In
addition to this ~Irs. Bundy had some miscellaneous
stocks, an interest of 43lh% in the remaining assets of
Ora Bundy & Co., together with all of the furniture
which was in the home occupied by decedent and herself
at the time of his death and substantially all of the
furniture. which ·was in the home occupied by Jack at
the time of his Father's death, as hereinbefore outlined.
On the other hand the- stepdaughter, Dora, s~ffered
serious illness and needed money for medical expense·s
·and had received a $10,000.00 partial distribution,
slightly less than $4,500.00 on final distribution (R 222),
United States Savings Bonds of a maturity value of
$2,800.00, 37lh% interest in Ora Bundy & Co., some
miscellaneous stocks equal to those distributed to Mrs.
Bundy and a large group of stocks and notes of no
V1alue. (R 223-224). She was also at death beneficiary
upon five $100.00 Unite-d States E Bonds worth approximately $400.00 It was not until the trial that her right
to her own mother's piano was finally coneeded to her.
She had, of course, also received 20% of the distribution
from Ora Bundy & Co., which, as we compute it, had
amounted to approximately $7,150.00 at the date of the·
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trial. She thus realized out of her father's assets
the approximate value of $24.,850.00 Finally Jack (who
worked with and for his father and who is undoubtedly
unfortunate in many respects, received from the- partnership 20% computed at approximately $7,150.00, a
partial distribution of $10,000.00, a truck of the agreed
value of $1,100.00 (R 126) and $1,500.00 as an additional
partial distribution (R 168-169) and, by right of survivorship, two $100.00 maturity value E Bonds worth
approximately $160.00, a total of .approxima.tely $19,910.00. From the work sheet proposed by Mr. Holther
on April 30, 1949 {Adm. Exhibit B) after making an
adjustment for the $1,500.00 partial distribution of June
1, 1949, it appears that the decree of the court deprives
him of some $2,000.00 in cash plus an interest in the
remaining assets of Ora Bundy & Co., upon the sole
justification of gossip of unknown persons overheard by
the Judge and the suspicions of his stepmother.
In concluding this statement of facts we wish to
say that it has been recognized that with regard to
Jack's effort to set ~aside this decree of disinheritance
his interests conflict with those of his sister Dora Goddard. A full disclosure of this circumstance- ha.s been
made to Mrs. Goddard -and she has advised counsel for
Appellants that she desires them to represent Jack in
his efforts to recover the baLance of his patrimony and
that she· does not desire to deprive him of it.
STATEMENT OF POINTS RELIED UPON

1. All furniture paid for by the Decedent and not
proven to have been the subject of executed intervivos
gifts to Respondent, is the property of the estate, and the
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Court erred in finding it was joint property, and in
failing to requirt> Respondent to inventory and account
for the same.
2. The evidenee does not support the Court's finding that John A. Bundy has received all of the property
from the estate that is due him, and he is entitled to
have distributed to him the balance of his one-third
share as proposed in the petition for distribution.
3. Upon the accounting- of the administratrix she
should be refused credit for the sum .of. $10,600 paid
herself as family -allowance during 3 years of administration, she having adequate facilities at all times for
her support.
A. The failure of the Administratrix to make a
full and fair disclosure of her separate property
and resources to the heirs and the Court in connection with the application for family allowance,
and her profiting thereby at Appellants' expense,
is extrinsic fraud requiring that the Order for
Family Allowance be set aside.
B. The Petition for Family Allowance was insufficient to invoke the power of the court to
grant a family allowance and the order is void.
C. The order of the Court striking from Appellants' Objections their allegations concerning the
derelictions and fraud of the Administratrix is
in error and should be reversed and disregarded.
D. Under Section 102-8-1 U. C. A., 1943, a sound
discretion, and a balancing of the equities of the
parties, requires that Respondent be allowed no
family allowanee.
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4. Respondent Administratrix, unnecessarily and
improperly, and to her own personal profit and the disadvantage of the heirs, delayed closing the estate beyond August 27, 1947, and having received on that date
a distribution of $10,000.00 cash, in any event should
not be allowed credit for any family allowance therea:rter accruing.
5. Respondent Administratrix should not be allowed compensation, and should be compelled to refund
the same,

A. Because she, being disqualified, waived compensation when the heirs consented that she act,
and
B. Because by her improper adminstration, especially in regard to her failure to account for
estate property, and her improper payments of
family allowance, and her resistence to the proper
efforts of the heirs to obtain an adjustment, she
has forfeited her right to compensation.
6. The 10 foot strip of real property distributed
to Respondent should he charged to her at the value of
$450.00 proposed by her counsel.
7. The Court erred in denying Appellants' motion
for leave to file out of time their motion to amend the
findings and decree and their motion for a new trial.

ARGUMENT
Point One: Furniture, the p·roperty of the estate,
has not been, but should be in.ventoried and accounted
for by Respond.ent Administratria;.
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It 'vas conceded at the trial that furniture from the
Brigham City home occupied by Decedent's son Jack
was either property of the estate or Jack's by virtue of
a gift from his father. Ho"·eyer, Respondent sold some
of it for $15.00, accounting- to the estate for the proceeds,
and the balance she appropriated to her own use and had
in her home at the time of the trial, by her own statement. On sympathetic and helpful leading by the Court,
she said she intended to have it distributed to her and
charged against her share. ( Tr. 77-80). This, however,
was not done. It has never been inventoried or appraised, and in the findings and decree prepared by her
counsel no mention is made thereof. She still has it.
The Ogden home was occupied by Decedent and his
wife, the Respondent, as a family dwelling, from the
time it was built in 1939 until ·his death in 1946. Most
of the furniture therein was purchased new to furnish
the new home, although Dora Goddard's uncontradicled
testimony was that there were some valuable items which
her father had owned prior to his marriage to her stepmother. Respondent testified that she purchased a few
_items (only two or three were identified) out of her
separate patrimony of $3000.00. Dora conceded that a
chair and some dishes were gifts to Respondent. But
the great bulk of the furnishings were obviously purchased and paid for by the Decedent in the course of the
maintenance of his home as . head of the family. Respondent was never gainfully employed.
On these facts in evidence (the Court having instructed Mrs. Bundy not to answer Counsel's questions
designed to identify which furniture was Decedent's and
which the Respondent's) the Court below found that the
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furnishing.s and furniture "were purchased, in part, by
Lovina R. Bundy with her sep.arate funds ... and were
all jo·irnt property, and as such did not, and does not,
constitute any part of the property of this estate'' and
were therefore properly omitted from the inventory.
The Court refused Appellants' offer of the attempted will (Exh. 1.) in which Decedent assumed the
right, an incident of ownership, to dispose of the furnishings in his home. It is submitted that this was
error and that it should have been admitted as a declaration of ownership bearing on his intent as to taking
title when he purchased and paid for the property, under
the doctrine announced in
Stanley v. Stanley
97 Utah 520, .
94 P2d 465, and
Mowrer v. Mowrer
64 Utah 260,
228 P. 911.
These cases involved title transactions respecting
real property, but it is submitted the principle is equally
applicable to persona1ity. In the Stanley case, one of the
facts held properly considered by the court wa.s that
d·ecedent there disposed of the property in question by
will.
There do not appear to be many cases involving
questions of title to personality as between husband and
wife under facts like these. However, the Pennsylvania
case of
Kauffman v. Stenger
30 A tl. 2d 239
seems to be in point.
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In that case certain personal property situate upon
the land occupied· by a husband and wife as their home
was levied upon under a writ of execution directed
against the property of the husband alone. The husband and ,,~fe both appeared and claimed that the
property was 0"\\1H?d by them as tenants by the entirety
and hence not subject to levy under the execution. ,It
was held that the evidence 'vas insufficient to show that
the wife had any interest in the property. The court
said:
''In g·eneral where husband and wife live
together in the same house and on the same land,
the ownership of personal property, though in t_he
possession of both, is presumed to be in the husband and not in the wife. Rhodes v. Gordon 38
Pa. 277. . .. A wife claiming property acquired
during coverture against her husband's creditors
is required to substantiate her claim by proof
sufficient to repel all adverse presumptions. How
the property was acquired, if by gift or descent,
or otherwise, or whose money paid for i1t, determines the issue. Heiges v. Pifer, 224 Pa. 628,
73 A. 950; Walker v. Reamy, 36 Pa. 410. Under
the circumstances the s·ame rule applies to the
present case and nothing short of 'clear, full and
satisfactory' proof can establish title by entireties . . . There is no evidence as to how the stock
which produced the increase, the subjeet of the
(execution) sale in this case was acquired and
in the absence of sufficient evidence the court
was bound to conclude that the burden of proof
of title by the entireties was not met.''
See also
U·pchurch v. Upchurch
(Georgia)
45 SE 2nd 855.
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If clear, full and satisfactory proof is required of
wife to establish her title or a joint title with her husband as against the creditors of her husband, it would
certainly seem that where, as here, a widow and stepmother claims property against the estate of her decea.sed husband which she represents as administratrix
for the benefit of her stepchildren, who have reposed
trust and confidence in her, the proof by which she must
establish her adverse personal claim against herself as
administratrix should be even more clear, full and satisfactory. As held in the case of Rice v. Rice ______________ Utah
____________ , 212 Pac. 2d 685, an administratrix is a trustee
in the broadest sense and is held to the same high and
strict accountability of a trustee. For the Court to
permit, as the trial court did, this administratrix-trustee
to appropriate to herself property paid for by her intestate Without any evidence whatsoever to justify her
personal claim of ownership, seems to the writer to outrage all of the concepts of equity. Certainly the only
evidence as to the ownership of the furniture in question
is the evidence to the effect that it was the Decedent's
money which paid for it. We submit that the finding
of the Court is erroneous and should he reversed and
that the decree settling Respondent's final account
·should he vacated and set aside and the cause remanded
with instructions to require the Respondent personally
and as administratrix to inventory and aecount for all
of the Decedent's furniture which has been appropriated
by her personally.
Point Two: The ev·i1dence does not support the
Trial Court's finding that John A. Bundy has received
all his share of the property of the estate, and he is entitled to a further distribution.
46
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Upon the death of his father, John A. Bundy by
operation of la-\Y immediately acquired a one-third vested
interest in the estate, subject only to administration
under the Probate Code. The reports and accounts of
the Administratrix affirmatiYely show that he has not
had distributed to him the full amount of his property.
The only possible basis for the trial court's finding
and decree that he has had his share is contained in his
testimony under citation on August 8, 1949. But it
there appears affirmat~i-·cely and without contradiction
that within two months of his father's de.a.th Jack aC'counted for the partnership money and property that
had come into his hands, an account was stated and he
paid the balance due the pa.rtnership by authorizing a
charge to his account upon the liquidation. And there
is absolutely no evidence that he ever took, or had, or
received any other partnership or estate property. The
only thing left as a basis for this act of disinheritance
is the passion and prejudice of the trial court, apparently evoked by the malicious gossip of unknown persons which was overheard by the trial court alone.
In this connection it is interesting to note that this
was done on the trial court's own motion. Nowhere in
Respondent's Petition for final Distribution does she
allege any facts as a. basis for the court's finding number 19·, or intimate in any way that she thought Jack
had had his share, or that he should be disinherited
because of his ''defalcations.'' On the contrary she
alleged (R. 158-159) that the residue should be distributed one-third to each of the three heirs, including
Jack.
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And at the trial, it will he remembered, counsel for
Respondent in effect stated that he had no evidence
to pre-sent to prove that J a.ck was further indebted to
the partnership or the estate.
Under these circumstances it is clear not only
that this action of the Court is not only against the
weight of the evidence-it is absolutely unsupported by
any competent evidence.
It is submitted ther_efore that the finding and decree of the trial court should be reversed on this issue,
and this court should direct a finding, conclusion and
decree distributing to John A. Bundy one-third of the
residue of the estate subject only to those advancements
to him which are shown by the Administratrix's accounts
on file herein, and compelling Respondent to disgorge
that portion of his share which she has distributed and
paid to herself in accordance with the erroneous decree.
Point 3. The .Administratrix should be refused
credit upon her accounting for the sum of $10,600.00 paid
herself as family allowance during three years of ad·
ministration, she having adequate faciZities at all times
for her support.
At the outset of a consideration of this proposition
we are met by the contention that the Appellants are
foreclosed by the order for family allowance made on
Respondent's petition on May 12, 1947 and not thereafter modified or set aside during the administration
and not formally attacked until the filing of Appellants'
objections herein. To this the Appellants have two
answers : First, the failure of the Respondent under the
circumstances to make a full and fair disclosure of her
48
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separate property and resources in connection with the
application is extrinsic fraud requiring· that the order
for family allo,vance be set aside, and second, under
the Utah Statute (Section 102-8-1 U.C.A. 1943) relating
to family allowance, the petition for family allowance
did not state facts sufficient to constitute grounds for
the issuance of the order and hence the jurisdiction of
the court "'"as not properly invoked for the making of
the order for family allowance and the order is subject
to attack here.
The allegations of the Appellants' objections and
petition of course constitute a direct attack upon the
order.
In connection with the first point it is to be observed that the Respondent here is in a most delicate
position and one in which she represents conflicting interests. In the first place she was the stepmother of
the other two heirs. It is apparent from the record that
at least so far as Dora Goddard is concerned she at once
reposed in her stepmother trust and confidence and
felt the natural hesitation of a stepchild to question
the motives and the action of her step~other. Dora
lived in Missouri throughout the administration of the
estate. Her suggestions for the retention of counsel for
the estate had been rejected at a meeting held immediately following Decedent's funeral. This would naturally enhance her diffidence. Jack Bundy lived out of
town all the time and it would appear from the record
that he was not one with any great capacity for business
detail or the legal nieeties of probate and trustee proceedings. The Respondent here upon her appointment
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as administratrix undertook a trust in 'vhich she represented several conflicting interests. First and most
obvious she was a surviving partner in Decedent's partner·ship, and under the circumstances it was apparent
that she would be the liquidating partner and as
such she would have to account to herself as administratrix and as administratrix would have to give herself
quittance as liquidating partner. This situation is so
obviously fraught with difficulty and possibilities for
loss to the beneficiaries of the trust that the law (Section 102-4-2 ( 5) U. C. A. 1943) disqualified her to act
as administratrix. Nevertheless, she sought for and
procured the issuance of letters to herself, and it does
not appear that she made any disclosure to the court
that she was disqualified to act.
When she took her oath as administratrix she assumed the duty of properly preserving the assets of the
estate for the benefit of the heirs, including Appellants,
to the end that the largest possible final distribution
might be made to them. As a surviving widow of the
Decedent applying for family allowance, her own personal interests would impel her to obtain the largest
possible family allowance for her own use (her stepc.hildren did not participate therein) and so to arrange
things that the family allowance would continue for the
longest possible time. The more family allowance and
the longer it continued the bigger the proportion of the
assets of the Decedent's estate would be paid to her. In
other words, for every $3.00 family allowance she as
administratrix could pay to herself as widow, each of
the stepchildren would receive $1.00 less out of the
assets of the estate. From the point of view of the heirs
the payment of family allowance was a depletion of the
50
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estate. Hence, her interests as widow in this regard
were diametrically opposed to the interests of the other
two heirs and to her interests as the administratrix
whose duty it "~as to preserYe the estate for the heirs.
Thus 'vhen she assumed the office of administratrix she
did so under conditions such that her personal interests
were diametrically opposed to her official duties and
obligations. Nevertheless, she did not hesitate.
It is apparent everywhere from. the record that
whenever her official duties and her personal interests
collided her official duties came off second best. Indeed
it appears from the record that she had no scruples
about paying herself the famil~ allowance even without
consulting the Court about it, for on December 30, 1946,
more than four months before the Court authorized it,
she paid herself $1500.00 as family allowance. (R. 081).
It is also interesting to note that she apparently did not
feel the need for asking the Court for a family allowance until some ten months after Decedent's death and
about six weeks before she received from the partnership a $7,200.00 liquidating dividend less a $2,000.00 advance thereon which had been made sometime theretofore. ·(See Objectors' Exhibit 7 as to partnership dividend.) All this time she \vas living in the family home,
paid for by the Decedent.
It will be recalled that she had acquired during her
marriage with the Decedent, and independently of Decedent's estate some $40,000.00 worth of assets, including some cash and a very substantial amount of United
States Bonds which are of course substantially the
equivalent of cash.
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Against this factual background let us consider
somewhat the Utah Statute on family allowance and its
legislative and judicial history. The present statute,
Section 102-8-1 U. C. A. 194·3 reads as follows:
''When a. person dies leaving a surviving
wife, husband or minor children, they shall be
entitled to remain in possession of the homestead
and to the use of the property exempt from execution until otherwise directed by the court; and
during a~ministralion shall receive such allow·
ance out of the estate as the court may deem
necessary and reasonable for their support. Such
allowance may date from the death of the decedent, but in case of insolvent estate shall not
continue for longer than one year, and must be
paid in preference to all other charges, except
expenses of last sickness and funeral expenses
of the decedent ·and costs and charges of administration. The court may, in its discretion exc·lude
from such fa.mily allow·ance, except homestead
rights, any person who may have a separate prop·
erty or income." (Italics supplied).
T·he last italicized sentence of the statute was added
by legislative amendment in 1915 under circumstances
which will hereafter appear.
The Statute (without the final sentence) first came
before the Supreme Court of Utah for interpretation in
1902 in the case of
In re Parks Estate
(Hilton v. Stewart)
27 Utah 489, 76 Pac. 650.
It was there held that-where a husband and wife had for
many years before his death lived apart under an agreement and she was not dependent on him for support, she
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\vas not entitled to a family a.llo,Yanc.e on his death, as
the statute g-ranting the allo,Yanc.e ""as intended to make
immediate provision for a family \Yhen the head is removed by death.
The Statute, still \Yithout the final sentence, next
came before the Supreme Court in 1904 in the case of
In re Pug-sley's E1state
76 Pac. 560.
27 Utah 489
The Supreme Court then held, without reference to its
earlier decision, that even thoug-h a portion of the real
estate of a decedent is set aside to the widow as her
share of the estate she has an absolute rig-ht to the allowance, the amount being· in the court's discretion. Although the duration of the allowanc.e was not involved
in the case the court observed that the period for which
an allowance must be g-ranted is ''during administration'' of the estate. The court also considered the
amount ($80.00 per month out of a $50,000.00 estate)
of the allowance involved there and held it not excessive
under the circumstances and quote-d with approval a
text writer to the effect that:
''In determining the amount necessary for
such purpose reg;ard may be had to the state of
the health, age and habits of the widow, the number and age of the children immediately dependent upon her, as well as the value of the estate,
and of her dower and distributive share therein.
It may also he considered whether or not she is
accustomed to hard labor, and thus enabled to
support herself, or if, by reason of all health or
other circumstances she is unable to do so.''
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Against that leg-al background the Legislature of
Ut~ah in 1915 felt it desirable to add to the Statute there
considered the sentence which now concludes the section, to-wit:
"The court may, in its discretion, exclude
from such family allowance, except homestead
rights, any person who may have a separate property or income.''
It is obvious that between 1904 and 1915 the workings of the rule announced in the Pugsley ease had been
found to he unjust and inequitable to heirs other than
the widow, as in the ease now at the Bar of the court,
and that the Legislature added this sentence to overcome the hard and fast rule of the Pugsley case. It is
clear that the Pugsley case is no longer the law except as to the factors to he ineluded in determining the
amount of the allowance.
It is also abundantly clear that under the law now
existing, including the Statute and the surviving portion of the Pugsley ease, the amount of the separate property and of the separate income of a person applying
for family allowance is essential and material to a determination of the amount of the family allowance to
be ordered by the court. Without this information it is
impossible for the court to exercise a sound discretion,
or for the administrator to know whether or not his duty
would compel him to oppose the granting of a, family
allowance.
To illustrate this point let us suppose two cases iii
both of which the children of the decedent have reached
their majority. In the first case suppose the widow
applying has a separate estate invested in United States
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interest paying bonds bringing· her monthly income of
$1,000.00 "\vhile the estate amounts to no more than $10,000.00 and the ehildren of decedent are both ill and unable to "\York. In the second ease suppose a widow who
is ill and "\vithout any separate property or income and
the estate amounts to $1,000,000.00 in cash and inte-rest
bearing bonds "\vhile the children of the decedent have
reached their majority and are all well and self-supporting. It is apparent that no court could exercise a proper discretion in fixing the amount of the allowance
without every one of these facts before him in each case.
It is further apparent that the misrepresentation
of any one of these facts, such as the separate property
and income of the applicant, or the failure to report such
a fact "~hen under a duty of full and fair disclosure, is
an extrinsic fraud rendering a decree obtained thereby
void at the election of any interested p·arly.
That is the law in Utah applicable to the personal
representative in a deeedent 's estate. See
Rice v. Rice

,

------------ utah -----------212 Pac. 2nd 685,

where this court very recently held that an executor is
a trustee owing an obligation to his legatees and devisees and to the .court and that an executrix who in distributing property improperly omitted land on which
building and facilities used by a brother were located
and omitted water rights as well was guilty of extrinsic
fraud justifying intervention of a court of equity. This
court there remedied the situation upon a petition filed,
as here, in the probate proceedings. In that case this
court quotes with approval from the case of
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Larrabee v. Tracy (Cal. App.)
126 Pac. 2nd 947, 951
as follows :
' ' Initially we desire to make it plain that an
executor or administrator occupies a postion of
the highest trust and confidence, not only to the
creditors and beneficiaries of an estate but to the
Court as well, and so he is required to act in
entire good faith. * * * Accordingly an executor is
a trustee in the broadest sense and is held to the
same high and strict accountability of a trustee.

* • •

"It is clear from the letters that appellant
was guilty of extrinsic fraud and that the trial
court was justified in so finding. But quite
apart from the extrinsic fraud, the trial court
was justified in vacating the order and decree
on, the ground that the executor had not made
to the court a full and fair disclosure of the rights
of respondent. * * * (Italics supplied.)
''Here the executor in his capacity of residuary legatee was unjustly enriched by the construction placed by the court upon the will upon
his ex parte showing, to the improverishment of
the legatee entitled to her legacy. It was a fraud
of the most serious nature. It involved not only
a breach of fiduciary duty to the respondent' but
a breach of duty to the court."
It is submitted that these cases are exactly in point.
Here the widow and the administratrix are one and the
interests of the two positions are conflicting. Here the
administratrix was under a duty to protect the assets
of the estate and that duty involved a duty to make a
full and fair disclosure to the court of all of her separately owned property and income in connection of her
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application for a family allowance. She made no such
full and fair disclosure and at the time she applied for
an order for famiy allo\Yance neither reported her separate property nor filed the inventory showing the
value of the estate. "\'Vithout presenting any testimony
or evidence and upon allegations \vhich were- mere conclusions she obtained an order of the court pursuant to
which she has profited at the expense of the estate to
the extent of $10,600.00.
Non-disclosure is a failure to reveal facts. It may
exist where there is neither representation nor concealment. A person who stands in a fiduciary or confidential relationship to another party has a duty to reveal
all relevant facts.
Restatement of the Law,
Restitution, Section 8,
Comment B, Page 33,
citing
Restatement of Agency
Section 390, and
Restatement of Trusts
Section 170 (2).
And where a relationship of trust and confidence exists
between the parties there is a duty to disclose all material facts, and failure to do so constitutes fraud. 37
CJS 247.

Morever when a person in a fiduciary relation to
another acquires property, and acquisition or retention
of the property is in violation of his duty as a fiduciary,
be holds it upon a constructive trust for the other.
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R·estatement of Restitution
Section 190, Page 780.
We submit it is also the law that where in the absence
of consent by a beneficiary a constructive trust would
arise, the consent of the beneficiary or his failure to
protest does not preclude him from enforcing a constructive trust if the beneficiary did not know his rights
and the material facts which the fiduciary knew or
should have known, or if the transa.ct·ion was not fair
and reasonable.
Restatement of Restitution
Section 191.
And a. transaction between the fiduciary and the beneficiary in which the· fiduciary is dealing on his own
aecount in regard to a matter within the scop~ of the
relation, can be set aside if the transaction is not fair
and reasonable.
Restatement of Restitution
Section 191, Comment on
Clause (d), Paragraph e.
And in 2 Bancroft Probate Practice, Page 648, it is said:
''The relations of both executors and administrators to the estate and to those theyrepresent
are confidential and fiduciary, and they act in
a high fiduciary character in their dealing with
the estate and its funds. They are required to
exercise the utmost good faith in dealing with
heirs or devisees or others whom they purport
to represent....
''It is fraud in law for the representative
to take, for his own benefit, a position in which
his interest will conflict with his duties.''
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Because of the Respondent's fiduciary relationship
she o"'"ed a duty of full and frank disclosure to the
Court and to .~..:\.ppellants. Her failure to do so is constructive fraud. It exists irrespective of moral guilt.
Her breach of leg·al and equitable duty is declared fraudulent by the law· '~ heeause of its tendency to deceive
others, to violate public or private confidenee, or to injure public interests. Neither actual dishonesty of purpose nor intent to deceive is an essential element of constructive fraud.''

37 'C.J.S. 211-212.
It is submitted that because of the fraud inherent
in her taking- a position 'vhere her duties and interests
conflict, in her failure to disclose, and in her profiting
thereby, the order for family allowance is void and she
can take no comfort therein. It follows that she has
paid herself $10,600.00 of the estate's money withou1
any authority and should not be allowed credit therefor.
There is an additional reason why the Respondent
cannot hide her profit at the estate's · expense behind
the order granting- family allowance. The Statute provides for ''such allowance . . . as the Court may deem
necessary ... ''
It is to be observed that there is in Respondent's
petition for an allowance no allegation whatsoever of
any facts showing the allowance to be necessary. There
is not even an allegation of the legal conclusion that the
requested a1lowanc.e was necessary. Nor is there any
allegation coneerning~ the value of the estate, nor any
allegation or report of the petitioner's separate property and income 'vhich would have stirred the court's
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discretion in opposition to the Petition. The inventory
had not been filed. No evidence was introdueed at the
hearing; the court merely found the allegations of the
verified petition were true.
We. submit, that the petition and the record supporting it are insufficient to invoke the exercise of the
trial c.ourt 's jurisdiction to grant a family allowance and
the order therefor is void.
As was held by this Court in the case
Stoekyards National Bank
v. Bragg
67 Utah 60,
245 P. 966,
while jurisdietional facts need not he recited in an order
to properly invest the court with jurisdiction of the
subject matter, they must appear somewhere in the record that describes the matter for the court's adjudica
tion and is the foundation for the order. A judgment
which is beyond or not supported by pleadings must fall,
and a judgment founded on a record showing that the
fundamental law w:as disregarded in its establishment,
is subject to direct and collateral a:ttack, a.nd will sua
sponte he notieed by courts and acted upon by them.
See also
Richins v. Hadlock
80 Utah 265,
15 P. 2nd 285, 291,
to the effeet that ''if judic.al direction is essential, it is
just as essential that a proper and sufficient petition or
· initial pleading of some kind be filed to invoke judicial
action.'' (Italics supplied.)
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In the criminal case of
State Y. Durfee
77 Utah 12
290 P. 9·62,

it wa.s held tha.t if facts alleg-ed do not constitute an offense, the defect may be raised eyen after veridict, and
the infirmity may be raised at any time, either before
or after judgment, and in a direct proceeding ''may sua
sponte be noticed and acted upon by the appellate tribunal.''
See also
Worley v. Peterson
80 Utah 27
12 P. 2nd 579, 587.
30 Am. Jur. "Judgements," Section 148.

Appellants' Objections and P~tition, being a direct
application in the same proceeding and to the same
court that considered the petition and granted the order,
and being based upon fraud in law and the insufficiency
of the supporting record, constitute a direct attack upon
the order.
Intermill v. Nash
94 Utah 271,
75 Pac. 2nd 157. ·
This case, morever, comes within the express exception of Section 102-1-8, U.C.A., 1943, providing that
an erroneous or defective statement of a jurisdictional
fact ''is available only on direct apvlication to the same
court, or on appeal.''
And see also the recent case of
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In re Linford's Estate,
Linford v. Linford
------------ Utah -----------207 P. 2nd 1033,
where this court held that an order settling a final account and decree of summary distribution entered after
due notice and hearing, did not protect an administratrix against a petition in the same proceeding seeking to
compel her to file a true and correct inventory and have
the property reappraised and distributed as provided
by law. The court said:
''This is not an ac.tion against the administratrix, but rather a petition directing the Court's
attention to .certain alleged fraudulent and improper acts on the part of the administratrix,
and requesting that the Court require her to properly administer the estate.''
We submit that this case is directly in point here.
Withdrawing funds from the estate for the· personal
advantage of the administratrix is precisely the same
as withholding funds or property which should have
been included. It is also direct authority for the point
that the approval of Respondent's first a.ceount herein
does not afford her any protection against this proceeding to compel her properly to account for the funds and
property of the estate.
We submit that the actions of the Respondent here·
are not hidden from the eyes of the Court by the orders
upon which she relies, b LlL c.u ,_:; h' ·(~ i >. and equitably
open for inspecton and correction in this proceeding.
1

If it be eontended that some of the facts hereinbefore argued are not properly before the court because
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the allPgations thereof "·ere by the court stricken from
Appellants' Objections, the sufficient answer is that
the order (if a minute order is effective) striking such
allegations "Tas error, and should be reversed and disregarded. In the first place, the authorities above cited
establish the releYance and materiality of these facts
and the allegations thereof. In the second place, Respondent's 1Iotion to Strike \vas directed only to the entire pleading, not to the parts thereof, and was made
only upon the ground that the pleading was filed late
w·ithout leaYe of court. The Objections, however, were
filed before any default was claimed or proceedings
taken, and, under the Code of Civil Procedure then in
effect, the time to plead was not shut off, but was in
effect thereby extended.
Sanders v. Milford Auto Co.
62 Utah 110,
218 P. 126.
The Court's order striking a part only of the Objections was obviously on its own motion, as Respondent made no such motion. And where a pleading is
entirely material, or only in p·art immatrial, it is secure
against a motion to strike .the whole. Where there is
relevant matter (which is apparently conceded here)
included within a portion of the pleading to which a
motion to strike is directed, the motion should he denied
under the Code.
1 Bancroft's Code Pleading 897
1 Bancroft's Code Pleading, etc.,

10 year Supplement, 342-3.
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It would seem that by her fraud Respondent may
well have forfeited the right to a family allowance under these circumstances. But even if it were to be conceded tha!t the court, upon the making of a full and fair
disclosure would then have the rigbt to award her a reasonable family allowance to date from the death of the
decedent, as the court below attempted to do by its finding that it would have approved the allowance even had
the disclosure made a·t the trial been made previously,
still we submit that under all of the facts and circumstances in this case it was and would be an abuse of the
trial court's discretion under the statute to allow the
widow a family allowance to the extent of $10,600.00,
two-thirds of which must come from the share of her
stepchildren, or to any extent in the light of the separate property owned by her or acquired by her by virtue of the decedent's death.
Here we have a widow almost in the prime of life,
with no showing of any disability, who has become independently wealthy through her marriage to the father
of her stepchildren. In adition to her indepdent wealth,
amounting to some $40,000.00, she will inherit equally
with each of her two stepchildren. There has been no
showing whatsoever of any actual need of a family allowance during any reasonable adminstration of the
estate. On the other hand the undisputed evidence shows
that the appellant Dora Goddard has been ill and under
very heavy medical expense and needs the money. When
all of the facts and equities are considered, we submit
that it was an abuse of discretion to allow this stepmother so to profit at the expense of her stepchildren
whose interests she, as a trustee, was duty hound to
protect.
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Point .f. RespoHdent . .4.dminstratria;, unnecesarily
and improperly, and to her own personal profit and the
the disadvantage of the heirs, delayed closing the est.a.te
beyond Au.gust "27, 1947, and, having recei.ved on that
date a distribut,io-n of $10,000.00 cash, ·iiJ~ any event should
not be allowed credi.t for any family allow~ance thereafter accruing.

Whatever may haYe been the necessity of a family
allo·w·ance for Respondent prior to August 27, 1947, it
disappeared on that date when she received a distribution of $10,000.00. It is Appellants' position that having received that distribution, her duty to the estate,
and to the heirs, required that she call the matter of the
family allowance to the court's attention with a view
to having her family allowance then discontinued. She
did not do so and here again Appellants' contend that
she was guilty of constructive fraud and should not be
permitted to retain the fruits thereof.
It is true that the statute says "that a widow shall
receive such allowance as the Court may deem necessary
and reasonable ''during administration.'' Under the
statute as amended it was within the court's discretion
to exclude the widow entirely because of her separate
property, even from the first, and certainly it would
seem to be the court's duty to do so when the bulk of
the estate was distributed after some fourteen months
of administration. The statute· does not require a family
allowance ''during the entire period of administration.''
It only requires that ''during administration'' that
allowance which is necessary and reasonable shall he
granted. Certainly the requirement that the allowance
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he limited to that which is deemed necessary and reasonable-, limits and modifies the phrases ''during administration", so that if the court in exercise of its
sound discretion should deem it necessary and reasonable to grant an allowance for six months of the period
of administration but unnecessary and unreasonable to
pay a family allowance thereafter, by reason of the separate property of the recipient, the spirit and letter of
the statute is followed with respect to the duration of
the allowance. In several of our sister states the statute
is very similar, providing that the court must make
''such reasonable allowance out of the estate as shall
be necessary for the maintenance of the family, according to their circumstances during the progress of the
settlement of the estate." It would ~eem that the phrase
''during the- progress of the settlement of the estate''
is substantially the equivalent of the U tab phrasing
"during administration." Under such a statute it has
been held in California that it is proper to discontinue
the allowance to the widow after making changes in the
estate hy establishing a probate homestead.
In re Taylor's Estate
55 Pac. 2nd 537.
Morever, since the policy of the law is speedy settlement and distribution, the phrase ''during the progress
of the stttlement of the estate'' is construed to mean
"during the time reasonable necessary" for settling
and closing the estate. An order for family allowance
therefore must he presumed to be satisfied when the
time arrives at which the estate may be settled; else
the administrators may delay action until the whole
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estate is consumed and nothing left to those who are
entitled to a distributive share of its assets. As was
observed in the niontana case of
In re Dougherty's Estate
86 Pac. 38:
"\"\..,. e do not think the law, though it is exceedingly regardful of widows and children
deprived as they are of their natural supporter,
completes any absurd result.''
Clearly a wido"~ who is also the representative is not
entitled indefinitely to prolong the settlement of the
estate and thus to continue to receive family allowance.
In re Ekins' Estate (Montana)
208 Pac. 956.
There is, moreover, no merit in the contention that one
cannot object to credits claimed in the widow's account
as representative for family allowance paid to herself
after the expiration for a reasonable time for closing
the estate because the objector might have compelled
final settlement and distribution at the proper time. Indulgence of others is no excuse for failure of the representative to close the estate at the proper time.
In re Dougherty's Estate, supra.
The last mentioned case seems to have become the
leading decision on the subject.
It is probably helpful to note that this court in its
very recent decision in the case of
In re Proudfit's Estate
----·------------ Utah ---------------219 Pac. 2nd 1076,
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has adopted the philosophy that a personal representative having a personal interest to be served thereby
cannot as against an interested party with an adverse
interest, claim eredit for expenses of administration during a prolonged administration, because conceivably if
such expenses were sufficiently high and the administration prolonged, the expenses would consume the entire value of the estate. That was a case in which operating expenses of real property were disallowed as deductions for state inheritance tax purpose, but the principle involved is identical.
In the case at Bar certainly no sufficient reason
is made to appear why the first account and petition for
partial distribution could not have been made a final
account and petition for final distribution. The bulk
of the assets. both in the estate and the partnership had
been liquidated and the interest in the partnership could
have been distributed in kind, as it was upon the final
distribution when made. As a matter of fact, notwithstanding the court's finding, it affirmatively appears
from the record that the partnership was liquidated as
a separate legal entity from the estate as contemplated
and required by law. All claims except estate and inheritance taxes had been paid and it is admitted that
there were adequate funds on hand to pay them and all
unpaid charges of administration. No one stood to
profit by the prolongation of the administration except
the administratrix. No excuse has been presented why
the inheritance and estate tax returns were not earlier
filed and the tax paid.
Our l!tah Statute contemplates and requires an expeditious administration. Under the provisions of Section 102-12-4 U. C. A., 1943, it is required that real estate
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must be distributed to the heirs at la'v as soon as the
time limited for presentation of claims has expired,
unless it satisfactorily appears that the rents are necessary to pay the debts of the decedent. And by Section
102-12-6, U. C. A., 1943 ; it is provided that when all
debts are paid, or sooner if before that time there a.re
sufficient funds in the hands of the administrator for
the payment of all debts and the estate is in a condition to be closed the administrator must render his final account and pray for settlement and distribution.
It is submited that in this case the Respondent has
violated her statutory duty by prolonging the settlement of the estate beyond the time when she presented
fier first account au_d has profited at the expense of
the heirs by breach of duty to the extent of two-thirds
of the family allowance accruing after the date specified. She should not be permitted· to retain the· proceeds realized by her breach of trust but should be compelled to disgorge them for the benefit of the heirs, the
beneficiaries of her trust, in accordance with the authorities hereinbefore cited~
Point 5. Resp<Ondent .Administratrix should not be
allowed compensation, and should be compelled to refund tha.t received becau.se she has W'airved compensation a.nd beca.use by improp·er and fraudulent administration she has forfeited her right thereto.

The question of the waiver of the administratrix's
compensation was not one of the facts alleg·ed in Appellants' Objection, the matter not having come to counsel's attention until the morning of the trial. However,
at the trial of the issues evidence of the waiver was
69
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

tendered and received pro forma under objection that
it was not within the issues and then striken because no
issue on waiver had been pleaded.
It is submited that the amendment should have been
allowed under the provisions of Rule 15 (b) U. R. C. P.
providing as follows:
"If evidence is objected to at the trial on
the ground that it is not within the issues made
by the pleading, the court may allow the pleadings to be amended when the presentation of
the merits of the action will be suhserved thereby and the objecting party fails to satisfy the
court that the admission of such evidence would
prejudice him in maintaining his action or defence upon the merits.''
No claim was made at the trial that the allowance of
such evidenee would prejudice Respondent. It is, of
c.ourse, thH established policy of the courts in Utah to
allow amendments liberally in the interest of justice and
with a view of obtaining a final trial of all issues on the
merits. If the amendment had been permitted, the evidence would have clearly presented a waiver. It appears that the agreement to serve without c.ompensation was a part of the consideration upon which the Appellants here agreed to waive the statutory disqualication of Respondent to act as administratrix. A promise or agreement made by a proposed personal representative that he will not charge for his services is
equivalent to a renunciation of his claim.
In re Machado's Estate (Cal.)
19H Pac. 505.
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The Respondent here, having' obtained from her stepchildren a \Yaiver of her disqualification in order to secure her appointment, should not now be permitted to renounce her renunciation and to claim compensation contrary to her original promise. To do so, we submit, violates the very essence of the principles of equity and fair
dealing.
It is a general rule that an administrator who has
been guilty of fraud, willful default, gross neglig·enee or
other misconduct in administration by reason of which
the estate has suffered detriment, may be deprived of
all or part of the compensation to which he would otherwise be entitled. Whether or not the misconduct is such
as to warrant the_ refusal of compensation in any parti~ular case is a matter resting within_ the discretion of the
court. Conduct of a personal representative causing unnecessary expense to the estate, such as fomenting vexatious and unneccessary litigation, may be considered a
sufficient cause for disallowance of commissions. (Here
the Respondent, in an effort to retain famliy allowance
improperly paid to herself and furniture and other p-roperty of the estate improperly withheld from the estate,
has forced the estate's beneficiaries to appeal to the
Supreme Court.) And where a personal representative
without just cause delays the settlement of the estate or
the distribution of the assets, compensation may be refused. Moreover, where a representative fails to account
for assets belonging to the estate he may be denied compensation. See
34 C.J.S., Page 1046 et seq.
and the cases cited.
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In connection with this point it is very interesting to
observe that substantially all of the communication be~
tween the administratrix and the heirs was conducted
through the attorney for the estate and apparently he
himself worked out all of the schedules for proposed
distribution, a function which should normally fall upon
an administrator. Although the administratrix may
have performed more of the duties of her office than the
Appellants were first advised of, she ce.rtainly has not
personally performed all of them and her counsel has
personally c.arried very much of the load, in addition to
the legal maters, for which he was independently paid
out of the assets of the estate.
The compensation allowed the Administratrix by
the trial court amounts to some $1, 700.00, two-thirds of
which in effect comes out of the pockets of Appellants.
Certainly it does not seem right and just to pay this
compensation to the Respondent for services conducted
in such a manner that the beneficiaries of those services,
toward whom she ·bears a fiduciary relationship, have
been compelled to carry this very expensive litigation to
the Supreme Court in order to secure their rights. It
is submitted that under all of the facts and circumstances the administratrix ~hould be deprived of her compensation because of her misconduct, or if an order of
forefeiture is not made by this court, the order, the order
of the trial court refusing. Appellants' tendered amendment should be reverse·d and the c.ause remanded for the
trial of the issue of waiver.
Povnt 6. Thie 10 foot strip of re:al property· distributed to Respondent .should be charged to- her at the
valu.e of $450.00 proposed by her counsel.
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Throug·hout the trial of the issues on their objections the Appellants, relying· upon the proposal of Respondent's counsel contained in Administratrix's Exhibit B "~hich had been mailed them just shortly before
filing their objections, assumed that the Administratrix
"'"ould carry out the proposal and charge herself $450.00
for the 10 foot strip of land distributed to Respondent
and "'"hich formed part of the lot on which the family
home "\Yas situate. It will be recalled that Respondent
sold this home as her own property shortly after the
distribution for $17,900.00. Certainly it would seem that
a valuation of $450.00 is modest enough. While the appraisers in their routine- appraisement might have felt
the value to the estate was only $100.00 when the land
was considered as an isolated 10 foot strip, yet when it
became legally attached to the proper~y of the Respondent Administratrix and was an integral part of a valuable home, its value was obviously enhanced.
Nowhere in the record is there any indication that
the Respondent at any time intended to repudiate the
proposal made by her counsel, which, it must be assumed, was made by her authority. It wasn't until after
the trial of the issues of fact was completed that Appellants learned for the first time that the Respondent intended to repudiate her proposal and to charge herself
only $100.00 in accordance with the routine court appraisal.
It is submitted that this is such double dealing by
a fiduciary that the court should not permit it to stand
but should either direct that the administratrix be
charged at the proposed sum or remand this cause to
the trial court for the taking of evidence as to the fair
value to be used for purpose of distribution.
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Point 7. The trial cou.rt erred in denying Appel·
lants' motion for leave to file out of time and motion
to amend fi~dings and decree arnd their motion for a
new' trial.

Under the circumstances set out in the affidavits
on file it is submited that the failure of Appellants'
counsel to file their motion for amendment of the judgment with respect to the $450.00 item to be charged to
Respondent and their motion for new trial was excusable neglect. That counsel for Appellants in charge of
this matter was out of the state on urgent business almost all of the time while the ten day period allowed
by Rule 52(b) is not disputed. Neither is it disputed
that the Clerk failed to mail the copy of the findings
and decree required by Rule 77 (d), nor that counsel had
relied thereon.
Under these circumstances it is submitted that the
exercise of a sound discretion required that Appellants' counsel he relieved of his default and permitted
to file Appellants' motions for amendment and new
trial out of time under the provisions of Rule 60 (b). The
Supreme Court of the United States in the case of
Hill v. Hawes
320 u. s. 520
decided in 1943, long before Utah adopted the Federal
Rules of Procedure, held that counsel for parties in litigation were entitled to rely upon the mailing of the
notice and that where counsel had so relied and notice
had not been given it was proper for the court to reenter a judgment and permit an appeal to be taken within the appeal period after the re-entry of judgment in
7·1
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order to relieYe the party from a judg-ment or order
taken against him through his mistake, inadvertence,
surprise or excusable neglect. When Utah adopted the
Rules of Procedure it added to Rule 77 (d) a final sentence to avoid the effect of this decision as to the time
of appeal only, but the effect of the decision a.s to relieving· a party of his default as to any other proceeding \Yhich must be taken \Yithin a fixed time after judgment was allo,ved to stand. Certainly that is reasonable and proper, for a ten day limitation on filing motion to amend and motion for a new trial is much more
stringent than the thirty day limitation on the taking
of an appeal. We submit that under the law and on
reason the trial court should have relieved Appellants
of their counsel's Q.efault and permitted the filing of
their motions out of time.
Probably any benefit that could have been gained
by presenting the motion for new trial can he accorded
by this court upon the appeal, so that the question of
the presentation of a motion for a new trial to the trial
court has become largely moot.
However, we submit that the trial court should be
reversed as regards his refusal to receive and file a
motion for amendment of the judg-ment and the cause
should be remanded for suitable proceedings looking to
the amendment of the judgment to charge the Respondent $450.00 for the strip of land distributed to her as
discussed under Point 6 supra.
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CONCLUSION
.' This has been a difficult case to try and to brief.
While we regret the length which this brief has assumed
the writer does not feel that he could in justice to his
clients effectively present the many points involved
with less space. The writer only hopes that his efforts
will he of some assistance to the court in arriving at a
just conclusion.
It is respectively submitted that equity and justice require that.. the rulings of the trial court upon the
various points hereinbefore considered should be reversed and the cause remanded with instructions to the
trial court to disallow the Respondent's claimed credit
for family allowance and for compensation and to require the Respondent properly to account for all of
the funds and property of the estate, including furniture, which have come into her hands and for which
she ha.s not accounted and that the trial court should
be further directed to charge Respondent $450.00 for
the 10 foot strip of land distributed to her.
Very respectfully submitted,
Paul Thatcher
For
T'HATCHER & YOUNG
Attorneys for Appellants
1018 First Security Bank Building
Ogden, Utah
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